reason for this increased activity revolves around their need for additional resources to fuel their expanding economy the ultimately, and most importantly, limits domestic unrest by increasing job opportunities and standards of living within China. The key question that arises from this increased activity is whether this activity is a threat or an opportunity for the United States. This paper demonstrates that this increased Chinese activity in Africa is an opportunity for the United States to achieve its interests in Africa through cooperation with China.
CHINA IN AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
Unlike in the past, it is Africans -not Westerners -who will determine the nature and depth of China's engagement in African affairs.
-Chris Alden 1 For over a decade, Chinese influence in Africa has increased dramatically, primarily through increased economic involvement on the African continent. This rapid entry and increase into African markets has been enabled by China's foreign policy of "no political strings" which, when combined with China's willingness to provide aid and concessionary loans, has proved to be tremendously appealing to many African leaders. 2 The questions that confront the United States are: first, is this increased Chinese activity in Africa a threat to U.S. national security? Second, what should be the United States approach to China and Africa? The answer to these questions begins with an analysis of China's internal challenges that has led to their increased activity in Africa.
Next, China's interests and methods in Africa will be reviewed as well as a discussion of the reaction to China's presence by African governments, businesses, individuals, and regional African leaders and organizations. U.S. interests and methods will be analyzed and finally conclusions made as to the implications for the United States regarding Chinese activity in Africa.
China's Internal Challenges
Tiananmen Square and the collapse of the Soviet Union and other communist nations in Eastern Europe sent shockwaves through China's Communist Party (CCP).
Realizing that the future of CCP was far from secure, the party conducted a thorough study of the reasons for the collapse of these other communist countries.
Understanding the lessons that were learned from this study is important to not only ascertain the reasons that China has looked to increasing its activities in Africa, but also to understand Chinese fears and perceptions that should help shape the development of U.S. reactions to China's increased activities in Africa.
David Shambaugh, in his book China's Communist Party: Atrophy and
Adaptation, explains that the collapse of the Soviet Union and other communist parties in Eastern Europe that followed immediately after Tiananmen Square caused the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to make "assessments of the causes of collapse of these other ruling parties, as well as analyz[e] the range of internal and external challenges to itself." 3 Chinese analysis showed that economic stagnation was "not an accidental consequence of the planned economy -to the contrary…it was a consciously planned feature of the system!"
The question pertinent to the discussion of Chinese activity in The second lesson learned by the Chinese fell into the area of international factors that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and has had a direct impact on the policy of "non-interference" in the internal workings of African states. Specifically, the
Chinese blamed the collapse of the Soviet Union on "a succession of Soviet leaderships with: external expansion and aggression; pursuit of international hegemony; the establishment of client states; interference in the internal affairs, and the occupation of, other states; and Cold War competition with the U.S."
As we will see, these conclusions have had a direct impact on China's increased activities in Africa. 9 The final, and most recent lesson learned by the Chinese occurred as they continued to study Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the collapse of communist states. as their goals. 10 Foremost among the lessons learned is that "there is unanimous agreement among Chinese analysts that the color revolutions would never have occurred were it not for U.S. subversive efforts."
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Liu Jianfei of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Central Party School states that "'promotion of democracy' is not just a tactical consideration, but it also has strategic intention…it organically combines 'promotion of democracy' with maintaining U.S.
hegemony." 12 Besides the fear that the U.S. will, or is, attempting to create similar conditions for a "color revolution" within China, is the more strategic issue that "the 'Community of Democracies," made up of 124 countries, will gain an increasing voice in the United Nations…if this goes on, China's role in the UN will be constrained." 13 The point here is not that China is completely adverse to democracies nor some aspects of democratic principles. This strategy, however, has been complicated by increased urbanization within China. 19 This movement of the Chinese population to urban areas has placed a great demand on the Chinese government to create more and more jobs to ensure that these urban dwellers have an opportunity to make a living. It is estimated that from 2006 to 2015 twenty-four million new jobs will have to be created in the cities each year and that "China's GDP must grow at a rate no slower than 7 percent annually if only to meet job creation needs."
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Not only does urbanization necessitate job creation, but it also multiplies the risk to the Chinese government should it be unsuccessful in meeting these increased job demands. The ability to organize and quickly mass large numbers of people in protest against the government is made easier through this increased urbanization. The only way that the CCP can maintain its economic growth, thus limiting domestic unrest, is to obtain the resources necessary to fuel its production requirements.
The third internal challenge facing the Chinese government is the acquisition of resources to facilitate the necessary job-creating growth of the Chinese economy. An outstanding example of this challenge is China's increased need for oil. China is now the world's second-largest petroleum consumer (6.5 million barrels per day in 2004) and accounted for 40 percent of the global demand growth for oil over the past four years.
This situation only gets worse over time, as the U.S. Department of Energy projects that by 2025, China's oil consumption will reach 14.2 million barrels per day. 21 "Chinese officials recognized that, in order to maintain the roaring pace of its economy, the country would need to have secure sources of energy as well as other critical resources." 22 A further reason that China has looked to Africa for its resources is an attempt to "diversify its energy imports away from traditional sources in the Persian
Gulf…because of ongoing political instability and U.S. military preponderance in and around the region." 23 This increased dependence on resources has placed China in an uncomfortable position however. China has based its policy since 1949 on the notion of self-sufficiency -they can no longer maintain this policy, specifically in the areas of energy, strategic minerals, forestry resources, and food production.
Chinese Interests and Methods in Africa
China's primary interests in Africa concern the acquisition of resources to enable its increased production capabilities and the opening of additional markets for the sale of its produced goods. A subsequent interest that has evolved since increasing its activities in Africa has been maintaining African state support for Chinese interests internationally, specifically within the United Nations.
China has come to Africa in an attempt to meet its increasing requirements for natural resources. In terms of resources, "over 31 percent of all of China's global strategic oil imports come from Africa." 25 Although oil and gas resources are of primary concern for China as it relates to Africa's resources, there are other resources that Africa provides in significant quantities to fuel China's economy to include lumber and cotton. The methods that China has utilized to achieve their interests will be discussed The methods that China has utilized in Africa to achieve its interests have revolved around adhering to a "non-interference" policy, the construction of "good-will" projects, and low/no-interest loans to African states that become economically tied to China. To facilitate China's access to vital natural resources in Africa, China has adopted a non-interference policy towards the African governments that possess these natural resources. This policy is best summarized by Premier Wen Jiabao when he stated that "we do offer our assistance [to Africa] with the deepest sincerity and without any political conditions." 33 This allows China to conduct economic trade with countries that western countries would not deal with due to their lack of good governance. This policy "is arguably the most contentious component of its engagement." 34 This policy has not only come in conflict with Western countries who seek to improve human rights and good governance on the continent, but also "found itself at odds with an emerging consensus on the necessity of good governance within Africa itself." 35 This policy of non-interference is especially problematic when it is understood that 50-80 percent of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa in natural resource exploitation is concentrated in six African states that include Sudan who has a notoriously bad human rights record. 36 China has complemented its policy of non-interference in the internal workings of African governments with numerous infrastructure and "good-will" projects in an attempt to strengthen the governments that they are working with and improve African perceptions of China. "In addition to new public buildings serving the needs of politicians and bureaucrats in African capitals, these same construction firms were building dozens of hospitals and schools." The opportunities provided by Chinese businesses have also come with a large influx of Chinese people that have begun to raise social issues for the individual African.
Although exact numbers of Chinese in Africa is very difficult to ascertain, estimated
Chinese populations in various African states give a basis for the extent of this influx of Chinese people. In 1980, South Africa had a Chinese population of 10,000 that had risen to between 300,000 to 400,000 in 2006 while Nigeria estimates that it has 100,000
Chinese living there. 49 This rise in Chinese population has increased tensions between African state governance and the rights and living standards of the African people. The current National Security Strategy (NSS) states, "our goal is an African continent that knows liberty, peace, stability, and increasing prosperity" which we hope to achieve through economic development and the expansion of democratic governance, and strengthening the capabilities of the African Union (AU). 58 The principal way that the United States has chosen to pursue these goals in Benin receives assistance through the MCC. This is an indication of the effect that China's activities in Africa has had on U.S. interests in the region. These resource rich states receive enough revenue through the sale of resources to China to maintain their governments and reap the benefits of China's non-interference policy to maintain their power.
This not only highlights the limitations that the MCC has in furthering U.S.
interests, but also demonstrates how China's activities in Africa counter U.S. desires.
As stated in the NSS, China "must act as a responsible stakeholder that fulfills its obligations and works with the United States and others to advance the international system that has enabled its success." Sudan to use the revenues that they gain through the sale of oil to China to fund their civil war and resist governmental reform, the fact is that the U.S. and "governments in 75 An additional consideration that indicates that China may be willing to change their policy of non-interference is a result of pressures from within the African continent.
The ability to maintain its policy of non-interference is especially hard for China when criticism of its policy comes from within Africa itself as demonstrated by its reaction to the creation of NEPAD. "For China, the ability and desirability of holding to its stance of 'non-interference' in African affairs is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain as its own embedded interests are subject to domestic influences and challenges by Africans from all sectors."
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History also demonstrates that regional stability will become more of an interest to China than is presently the case. The United Kingdom's and United States' experiences in the Middle East are similar to China's current experiences in Africa:
We are now treading the same ground [as the UK], there are already signs that China is about to follow in our footsteps. The pattern is as follows: what first brings the external great power into the region is trade. For that reason, it is unconcerned about how the people of the region govern themselves…over time, however, the great power's trade relationships expand to the point where it becomes economically dependent on the Middle East and particularly on its oil. Once this happens it does care about who rules where and who conquers whom because these matters can have a profound impact on the great power's own economic stability. 
